TO SPARE OR NOT TO SPARE: :: essays research papers

TO SPARE OR NOT TO SPARE: THAT IS THE ETHICAL QUESTION A twenty-something year old Caucasian male engineering student travels from Prescott, Arizona to Friendsville, Tennessee during his summer and winter breaks from school. The length of distance covered in one trip is about 1800 miles. He drives a 1968 Ford Mustang. This car is in need of restoration, but is all-original. Because he is alone, this student cannot stop at anywhere that is not public. Even a Rest Stop is too risky for a lone traveler. This student driver does not even drive at night. The dilemma begins at the half-way point of the trip, the middle of the Texas pan-handle on Interstate 40 East. This area has few gas stops and almost no rural or suburban areas. The student passes a car on the side of the road. This car is driving on a flat tire. Unfortunately the only safe option for this student is to continue down the road and pray for the person in distress. The student-driver stops for gas at the only stop for another 50 miles. Like most gas stops in this area, it stand s alone on this exit. The student-driver pumps gas into his car and goes inside to pay for the fuel. As the driver is about to leave, he is stopped by a 60 to 70 year old Caucasian male. This man has a flat tire. He recognizes the car that passed him earlier and asks for help. This man recognizes that the Mustang’s spare will fit his car, and he proceeds to ask the student if he would be willing to part with his spare. The moral dilemma begins. If the student gives the man the spare, his guilt for passing the man will be extinguished and it will be replaced with the satisfaction of helping another human being from being stranded. However, this would leave the student without a spare tire for the last 900 miles of his trip. The three ethical systems being used to respond to this moral dilemma are Kantism, Utilitarianism, and Epicurism. In this dilemma, there are two choices, and each system has its own way to respond. Kant would begin by criticizing the analysis of the consequences, because consequential ethics â€Å"lacks universality†, â€Å"leads to rules that violate our ordinary moral sensibility†, and â€Å"reverses the proper relationship between ethics and happiness.†(Symposia. 2005.

Politics, Presidents and War Essay

War is inevitably an exercise in politics. In the best case the political process provides checks and balances that can contain or even prevent war. In other cases the political process itself is the primary driving force towards war. These two realities are not mutually exclusive. The Persian Gulf War of 1991 provided evidence of both political realities. Politics influenced the nature and the course of the war, and vice versa. In the context of what has happened since 1991 the Persian Gulf War, also known as â€Å"Desert Shield† and â€Å"Desert Storm†, is a fading memory. The political importance of this war cannot be underestimated, however. The socio-political impact of this war would come to fruition within a decade. This impact is part of a continual process of reflexivity between war and politics, particularly in the United States. For better or worse, the Presidency itself was altered by this war and the associated political processes. Storm Clouds The Persian Gulf War of 1991 had immediate causes. When Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi military invaded oil-rich Kuwait a crisis was created. The United States and a coalition of mostly Western nations were compelled to respond. Kuwait was a strategically important ally in the Middle East. If the invasion was allowed to stand, Saddam Hussein would be in position to launch an attack against Saudi Arabia, another important ally. After working several months for a resolution within the United Nations, the coalition prepared to launch an attack. The agreed upon mission was limited to ousting Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Going any further would require much more discussion. For Iraq, the invasion of Kuwait came on the heels of a failed war with Iran in which millions were killed. War debt was draining Iraq’s coffers. There was also a political angle for Iraq. Saddam sensed that he could not appear to be weak in any way. Using revisionist history, Saddam claimed that the Iran war had somehow been a success. That message was driven home as Saddam erected even more palaces and monuments dedicated to himself. The invasion of Kuwait was a calculated political gamble. The United States and other nations had backed him in the war with Iran. He believed, at worst, that those nations would be ambivalent to his takeover of tiny Kuwait. Meanwhile he peppered the Iraqi media with trumped up charges against Kuwait. Even if he was eventually forced out, Saddam believed that he could plunder the wealth of Kuwait before retreating. With a demoralized military after the Iran war, Saddam also felt he had to keep his army occupied so they could not conspire against him. He tried to put them in a easily winnable situation in an effort to solidify his own power. Knowing how Saddam operated, the United States made certain not to underestimate him. Senator William V. Roth, Jr. (R. -Del. ) Said that â€Å"He is as unpredictable as a desert storm and as deceptive as a mirage† (Mitchell, 1991). When Saddam failed to comply with repeated United Nations resolutions, the coalition mobilized itself for war. As in any war, the crisis that caused the start of the war was simply the culmination of many prior socio-political movements and actions. With that in mind the American administration started a concerted political effort to build internal support for the war. The threat was maximized for public consumption. â€Å"President Bush declared that what is at stake is a New World Order† (Abdulla, 1994). Having successfully swayed public opinion, the administration now had to successfully fight the war in both military and political terms. Politics and Policy In Washington politics the terms â€Å"Vietnam War† and â€Å"quagmire† are toxic. Any association with them can mean the quick death of a policy or military initiative. In the lead-up to the war politicians capitalized upon the Vietnam syndrome from a number of angles. Opponents of any military intervention used the phrase â€Å"potential quagmire† numerous times in their arguments. Once it was apparent that a war was going to take place, even supporters used this term in an attempt to shape the type of war it would be. In other words the political situation required that the coalition go in with overwhelming force, but minimize civilian casualties at the same time. The administration knew it could not allow an extended guerilla conflict to emerge. The powerful triangle of war, television and politics had defeated the Johnson administration during Vietnam. This time, the administration was prepared to take extreme measures to prevent such a situation from happening again. Meanwhile, coalition leaders toed a tricky political line in maintaining world support for the action. Since before the war had even begun the issue of oil had prompted loud voices of disapproval about the impending war. Opponents claimed that the U. S. led coalition was not so concerned with Saddam’s violation of International Law or with the freedom of a formerly sovereign nation. Instead, they claimed that the primary reason for the upcoming attack was to secure fuel for the oil-thirsty Western nations. Oil was a vital strategic concern. Access to cheap oil was a pillar underneath the American economy. Two of the most reliable pre-war suppliers were Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In defending these nations, the U. S. hoped not only to secure its oil supply but also force a split between the nations in the OPEC oil cartel. In the political arena, though, this by itself was not a justifiable reason to fight a war. This sentiment was particularly true among the European nations in the coalition. Holding this coalition together was critical to the overall effort. From the perspective of the administration, the war could not be seen as â€Å"trading lives for oil†. That would reinforce world perceptions of the United States as a greedy empire. Eventually the eroding effect of public opinion would have weakened the tenuous coalition. In fact, this had been part of Saddam’s political strategy from the outset. â€Å"Saddam Hussein apparently counted on American public pressure to prevent a committment of troops to defend either Kuwait or Saudi Arabia† (Carlisle, 2003). Vietnam might be thought of as a constrained war, not in terms of casualties but in terms of the lengths the U. S. was willing to go to ensure victory. The Gulf War, in contrast, was a â€Å"careful† war. Every attempt was made to minimize both coalition casualties and the public reporting on those casualties. The military also went out of its way to project the image that Iraqi civilians were not targets. Reports began to surface about large numbers of Iraqi casualties, but they were largely squelched by the constant presentation of surgical strikes on the enemy. For his part Saddam tried to play up images of apparently innocent Iraqi casualties. American officials admit, in hindsight, that Saddam played the political game well. After all â€Å"Saddam is a politician not a soldier† (Dunnigan, 1992). The Outcomes Militarily, the Gulf War at first appeared to be as close to flawless as is possible. The Iraqi military was swept out of Kuwait in a matter of weeks. The military had taken reporters into their ranks while still tightly controlling the flow of information. Images of deadly accurate smart bomb deployments and successful interception of Iraqi SCUD’s by American Patriot missiles permeated the nightly news. President Bush’s approval ratings skyrocketed to unprecedented levels. Politically the effort was less successful. According to U. S. News & World Report: â€Å"But inasmuch as victory suggests the decisive defeat of an opponent, there was none. This triumph without victory was perhaps the most striking irony of the entire conflict† (1993). The U. S. had hoped that Saddam would be overthrown in the process, but was unable to make the case that it should be done by the coalition. When parts of the country revolted against Saddam, the lack of coalition help allowed Saddam to crush them brutally. At the time, the outcome seemed acceptable. According to R. W. Apple, Jr. : â€Å"they appear to have done just enough to make it unlikely that a second Persian Gulf war will erupt any time soon† (1991). In hindsight it is apparent that this set the stage for another Gulf War. Ten years later, the U. S. and a smaller coalition of nations launched an attack with the expressed purpose of overthrowing Saddam. The Presidency The Gulf War of 1991 was a watershed moment in the history of the Presidency of the United States. The War Powers Act theoretically reserved the right to make war to the U. S. Congress. An increasingly long line of Presidents have resisted this notion, finding loopholes in order to â€Å"defend American interests†. The Gulf War was unique in that the President undertook a sustained effort to marshal international support before even gaining domestic support. Critics charge that Bush was trying to â€Å"circumvent Congress by seeking United Nations approval† (U. S. News & World Report, 1993). There was dissent in the Congress to the asserting of political power by the President. Many felt that the issue was not thoroughly debated. George Mitchell (D. -ME) wrote that: In effect the President, overnight, with no consultation and no public debate, changed American policy from being part of a collective effort to enforce diplomatic sanctions into a predominantly American effort, relying upon the use of American military force. (Mitchell, 1991) Nevertheless, this would become the template for future Presidents wishing to undertake military action. A formal declaration of war, as they saw it, was unnecessary. As the Commander-in Chief the President is charged with defending American interests. A further asserting of Presidential power was the perceived â€Å"shackling of the press† (U. S. News & World Report, 1993). For the first time, a full-scale effort to control the modern, multimedia press was undertaken. The â€Å"in the National interest† argument was used to full effect. From this perspective the administration could paint uncooperative media as unpatriotic or untrustworthy. Conclusion In Vietnam, television had shown Americans the realities of modern warfare. Political ramifications soon followed. In the Gulf War of 1991, the conflict was, in fact, planned from a political and media perspective. The war marked an increase in the assertion of Presidential power. It also marked an increase in the ability of that branch to use the media, public opinion and internationalism to increase that power. It was a political evolution that has now become commonplace. Was the Persian Gulf War of 1991 a success? Militarily, it was. The military carried out its proscribed mission with remarkable efficiency and media savvy. In terms of international politics, it merely preserved the status quo while not resolving any underlying problems. In terms of domestic politics it allowed for an increase in Presidential power while setting the template for future military conflicts in successive administrations. The template worked efficiently for a while, but by the end of the second Bush’s administration the political pendulum was swinging back toward Congress and more hesitancy in carrying out large-scale military actions. Works Cited Abdulla, Abdulkhaleq. â€Å"Gulf War: the socio-political background. † Arab Studies Quarterly. 16. 3 (1994). Apple, R. W. Jr. â€Å"After the War: Politics: Another Gulf War? † The New York Times. 10 Mar. 1991: B01. Carlisle, Rodney P. Persian Gulf War. New York: Facts on File, 2003. Dunnigan, James E. & Bay, Austin. From Shield to Storm. New York: Morrow & Co. , 1992. Mitchell, George. â€Å"Confrontation in the Gulf: War and Peace: A sampling from the debate on Capitol Hill. † The New York Times. 11 Jan. 1991: A03. U. S. News and World Report. Triumph Without Victory: the unreported history of the Persian Gulf War. New York: Random House, 1993.

Digging Deep Homosexuality Revealed Essay - 1647 Words

Did you know that homosexuality is not a mental or emotional disorder? Homosexuality has become quite a controversial topics amongst our society. Most people who realize they are homosexual are too scared to admit to the public who they really are. Then you have others who are openly confident about their sexuality as gay or lesbian. This issue has become more and more talked about and has developed multiple media acknowledgements. Homosexuality can be broken down into several different views. For those who do not understand or are unfamiliar with why a person is homosexual tend to ask an array of questions. What makes you a homosexual? Can you change your sexuality? What does the Bible or other religions say about homosexuals? All of†¦show more content†¦She is very famously know for doing the voice over for the little fish Dory in Disney’s, â€Å"Finding Nemo.† If you know anything about Ms. DeGeneres, you can out right tell she is an open book. She jokes and pokes fun at her sexuality. She is a phenomenal role model for woman of homosexual orientation. When people hear the word â€Å"gay† they b default think of men. However, Ellen has opened a new door for these women. She expresses her opinion and her laid back attitude towards gays and lesbians. Ellen isn’t the only influential person that has lived among us. She is accompanied by Anderson Cooper, Journalist and TV personality. Olympic Diver, Tom Daley. CEO of Apple, Inc., Tim Cook. Senator of Wisconsin, Tammy Baldwin. Marc Jacobs, Fashion Designer. Homosexuals are even dated back to the beginning of time. The three most influential people would include Greek Philosopher, Socrates, and Leonardo da Vinci and William Shakespeare. All of these people have been beneficial to society and have brought forth useful innovations. In today’s world we have well developed concepts and ways of proving and analyzing every biological aspect of the human body and mind. It has been known for many years how chromosomes determine which baby will be a boy or a girl and how the chromosomes develop to make differentShow MoreRelatedRent: A Religious Phenomenon Essay2215 Words   |  9 Pagesfertilizer and fuel oil, Peewee Herman, Tabloid TV, ATMs, all packed for a generation weaned on alternative rock and `Friends (Royce 11). These things are social icons in America, who hasnt heard of, or owned, effects such as these. Yet digging deeper we see that it is a depiction of the creed of an alternative religion and shows humanity how we should live our lives. Rent etches its place in your hearts with a timeless, transcendent hope: I want to be somebody; I want people to knowRead MoreHsm 542 Week 12 Discussion Essay45410 Words   |  182 Pagesprayer.   Just as a personal belief, I often wonder why it is that modern medicine is not seen as a gift from above or a way that prayers have been answered.   By no means am I to   judge others beliefs and I understand these notions are held and have a deep tradition. I Your example made me question torts and religion and I found some interesting information published by American Bar Association. http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/law_trends_news_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/litigation_runquistRead MoreLogical Reasoning189930 Words   |  760 Pagesthat Sanderson uses in his argument. It is something he wants the reader to believe, but it is not something he is arguing for. Regarding the quality of Sandersons argument, saying only I dont like his argument is insufficient; it doesnt go deep enough. This kind of answer is just opinion. To go deeper, the opinion should be backed up by reasons. The weakest part of Sandersons argument is that he isnt giving us good enough reasons to believe his conclusion. He makes the relevant comment